The basic ideas of Cournot and those who came after him are related to the recent work of Nash and his notion of an "equilibrium point." It is shown that the Nash equilibrium point incorporates the main contribution of Cournot to the solution of the duopoly problem and that the major criticism that may be made against the Cournot equilibrium may also be made against the Nash equilibrium. It is then indicated to what use this weakness might be put in the study of bargaining.
Foreword
The paper Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem by Marc Nerlove was written in August 1953 and is remarkable in its grasp of essentials and in its maturity, given that Nerlove was only 19 years of age at the time. Nerlove had been an undergraduate at the University of Chicago. He took his first year of graduate study at the Johns Hopkins University, 1952-53, but returned to Chicago for the summer of 1953. He was fortunate enough to obtain a summer job as research assistant to Professors Jacob Marschak and Tjalling Koopmans at the Cowles Commission. That summer, in partial fulfilment of his joint commitment to Marschak, he wrote the afore mentioned paper.
Marschak did not pay attention to it and the paper was forgotten by Nerlove, lost from his files and does not appear on his CV. It has recently been retrieved from the Jacob Marschak Papers at UCLA.
The 1953 paper pointed out that in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium each agent makes a particular incorrect assumption about the other's out-of-equilibrium behavior. This is noteworthy, given its date. Nerlove recapitulated Nash's proof of the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and provided a simple example of how to calculate it.
But Nerlove probed deeper. He knew about "conjectural variation" from Frisch (1933) , rephrasing it as "each producer believes that the output of his rival depends on his own output in some definite fashion," and proceeded to discuss the appropriateness of the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot model, leading to a suggested definition of a "strong equilibrium."
This line of reasoning in Nerlove's brief paper is very interesting, as it predated Bresnahan (1981) by more than 25 years. Nerlove's "strong equilibrium" captured the same idea as Bresnahan's "consistent conjectures equilibrium". The "strong equilibrium," if it exists, is a "consistent conjectures equilibrium." No further analysis was offered by Nerlove. Bresnahan's "consistent conjectures equilibrium" received criticism, which would also apply to Nerlove's suggested definition of a "strong equilibrium." The essentially dynamic character of the argument was later captured in a dynamic model by Maskin and Tirole (1987) . Later literature on learning and evolution puts more emphasis on Cournot's fictitious play, thereby enhancing the relevance of this process. On the other hand, it might be argued that evolution leads to conjectural variations (Dixon and Somma 2003 ).
Nerlove's proof of the existence of equilibrium is not for games in extensive form.
Each player is assumed to choose strategies for the whole of the play simultaneously.
Understanding of games in extensive form and the complications thereof came later, with Schelling (1958) .
Nerlove had indeed taken an interest in game theory even earlier; his undergraduate honors thesis in mathematics was titled On the Theory of Games. It had won him a prize and was published in the Student Essay Annual in 1952.
Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem
In 1838 Augustin Cournot showed, in his famous discussion of the two mineral springs, that on certain assumptions a determinate equilibrium solution is obtained for the duopoly problem and that this solution can be extended from duopoly to oligopoly. It is not consonant with our purpose here to discuss Cournot's extension to problems of oligopoly, but to attempt an extension of Cournot's basic assumptions and concept of a solution to the general two-person bargaining situation.
The Cournot solution for undifferentiated duopoly is based upon the assumption on the part of each rival that the other will go on producing a definite quantity irrespective of what he himself produces. By substituting this constant quantity into the demand function, the duopolist can now proceed to equate his individual marginal revenue with marginal cost and thus maximize his own profits. Since initially neither duopolist is likely to guess the output of his rival correctly, outputs will be altered subsequently until, in fact, the assumption on the part of each rival that the other will not alter his output becomes correct. The characteristic feature of the Cournot model is that if each duopolist continues to assume that the other will not change his rate of output, then ultimately they will prove to be correct although during the approach to equilibrium they will be wrong.
The Cournot model may be extended by dropping the assumption that each rival assumes that the other's rate of output is fixed and replacing it by the assumption that each producer believes that the output of his rival depends on his own output in some definite fashion. The assumed change in one's rival's output due to an incremental change in one's own output is usually termed "conjectural variation", see Frisch [1933] .
Thus the original Cournot model may be thought of as a species of the extended model in which "conjectural variation" is zero.
The extended Cournot model may be illustrated by the following schematic diagram (Fig. 1) . 1  is a function which maps the set of present outputs of duopolist 2, { 2 q }, into the set of next period outputs of duopolist 1, { 1 q }. Similarly, 2
The mapping is carried out in the following way: Given the present output of one's rival, a function relating changes in one's own output to changes in his own marginal cost curve, and the demand for the product, one calculates that output, say 1 q , which will maximize one's own profit, taking account of the belief, of course, that the rival's output will vary with one's own in some definite fashion. Outputs will be altered until each producer no longer has the desire to alter his output, i.e., cannot increase his profit, given his rival's output and his conjectured relation between that output and his own. Thus the point of equilibrium is that point at which 1  and 2  cross. equilibrium point There is, of course, no necessity that such a point exist or that it be unique. If 1  crosses 2
 from below, the point of intersection is clearly not an equilibrium, for to the right of the intersection 1's output tends to rise and 2's output tends to fall. The functions 1  and 2  need not be monotonic; and, hence, 1  may intersect 2  at many points, more than one of which may be an equilibrium. For our purposes it does not seem worthwhile to derive conditions on the marginal cost and revenue curves and the conjectured relations of output of the two producers that would insure the existence and unicity of an equilibrium.
[Should the reader be interested in such a discussion, the best, to my knowledge, may be found in Stackelberg [1934] , especially chapter 4 and the mathematical appendix. Fellner [1949] gives an excellent English discussion of The basic ideas involved in the Cournot solution are, then: a) that each of the two rivals believes that his opponent will react in a certain definite way to his own action (including the possibility that he will not act at all), and b) that there exists at least one set of two actions, one on the part of each rival, such that profit, utility, or some other measure of satisfaction, will be maximized for each action separately given the other action as some function of the first. It is clearly not necessary to assume, with Cournot, that the only course of action a producer may take is to vary the quantity he produces.
Had Cournot been writing in 1953 instead of 1838, he might have formulated his problem in terms of strategies and the maximization of utility rather than quantity produced and the maximization profit.
In a recent communication Nash [1950a] has formulated the Cournot solution in a theory of games fashion. In two-person constant sum games "minimax" rationality and "saddle point" equilibrium can be attained simultaneously. When the number of players is increased beyond two and/or the game is made variable-sum, a specific von Neumann solution does not, in general, exist. By sacrificing "minimax" rationality and defining a solution in terms of the Cournot type equilibrium property, Nash has arrived at an uneasy compromise.
For the sake of exposition, and following Samuelson [1950] , let us give the 
So much for the definition of equilibrium. Need such an equilibrium point always exist? Nash [1950a] shows that the answer is yes, if we do not confine ourselves to simple-discrete pay-off matrices and to pure strategies, but admit mixed strategies and/or Utility and its relationship to game theory and the bargaining problem, and particularly the problem of the transferability of utility will be discussed in a later paper. Suffice it to say that Nash's formulation of the bargaining problem avoids problems of transferability. ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( (1 ) , (1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) 2) For all 2 s ,
By defining a suitable transformation on the set of ordered pairs of mixed Before we discuss the actual process of locating the Cournot-Nash equilibrium points for games, we might at this point go into some of the objections to the basic concept underlying this solution to the bargaining problem and the question of its relevance to experimental work in bargaining.
It is essential to realize that, as long as rivals make Cournot assumptions about each other's behavior, the analysis cannot be adjusted in such a way to make the rivals right for the right reasons, instead of describing a situation in which they turn out to be right for the wrong reason. If an individual knew that his rival was reacting along one of the reaction functions, say 2 1 ( ) s s , then he would not be reacting along 1 2 ( ) s s . Instead he would try to select the point along 2 1 ( ) s s which was optimal from his own point of view.
Normally the point so selected would not be the intersection point. Therefore, if we make the assumption that the two rivals are aware of the "true" reaction functions, then the "true" reaction is no longer true! Hence, the assumption that the two rivals know of each other that they react à la Cournot is an inconsistent assumption. A determinate equilibrium of the Nash-Cournot type is not what might be called a "rational" solution.
Generally speaking, if the two rivals change their rather arbitrary and incorrect assumption about each other's behavior, then there will be no tendency towards a restoration of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The kind of stability which exists in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is of very little importance because the equilibrium proves unstable as soon as one rival becomes doubtful about his rival's behavior.
It is possible to define what might be termed a strong equilibrium point which would be immune to the above criticism; i.e., to the unilateral waking up by one of the passive Cournot-Nash rivals. All that is required is that in addition to the condition on 0 0 1 2 ( , ) s s given above in (1) and (2) we add the condition:
That is, the equilibrium strategy for each rival must be optimum, not only against the other's equilibrium strategy, but also with respect to any other of his own when the rival plays optimally against that other strategy. I strongly suspect that this definition of a strong equilibrium point restricts, to the class of game with ordinary von NeumannMorgenstern saddle points in pure strategies, the existence of games with strong equilibrium points.
The Cournot-Nash weak equilibrium has the advantage of being easily calculable for normalized games of the non-constant-sum type. I believe quite definitely that deviations from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in an experimental game will be extremely useful in measuring the effect of the learning process upon the ultimate outcome of a bargaining situation; for, as indicated above, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is an "irrational" or non-optimum equilibrium which nonetheless possesses from the standpoint of the bargainer some important characteristics of an optimum. Other factors will undoubtedly play a role in producing outcomes significantly different from CournotNash equilibrium, and the relationship of the equilibrium to other factors needs more looking into.
It is worth noting that both the initial experiment and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept presuppose an attempt to exclude collusion. To what degree this may be achieved and relevance of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to situations where it cannot be excluded is an important consideration.
To illustrate how a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is actually found, let us consider a simple game. Let A and B be the two players, who have control over the sets of pure strategies 1 2 { , } a a and 1 2 { , } b b respectively. The pay-off matrices for A and B are as follows: Table 1 A B Let A play 1 a with probability p and 2 a with probability (1-p), and let B play 1 b with probability q and 2 b with probability (1-q). A's mathematical expectation, which we assume he wished to maximize is 5 4 (1 ) 5 (1 ) 3 (1 ) (1 )
